Newsweek⁠36%

Will The Real Supreme Leader Please Stand Up? (If He Can) ⁠42%

By David Averre⁠38%

7/25/2026, 9:00:00 AM

BS Summary: This article contains 37 faulty reasoning types, including Post Hoc (False Cause), Appeal to Authority, and Overconfidence Bias, with Negativity Bias as the most egregious example at 12.1% saturation with 265 hits. Analysis detected 2,523 faulty-reasoning hits from 2,184 analyzed words, generating a BS Score of 45.9% and a BS Rank of ⁠42% (12,853 of 21,886 articles). This article is better (less manipulative) than 58.70% of the article peer group.

Mojtaba Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is still nowhere to be found. 
He vanished when his father and predecessor as supreme leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was assassinated in a U.S.-Israeli strike back in February, and has remained “out of office” ever since. 
Neither Mojtaba's inauguration as supreme leader, nor even his father’s state funeral, were enough to pry him from the shadows even for a moment. 
Take all reports at face value, and you’ll find a Khamenei Jr. that is disfigured and legless, but lightly injured. 
In Iran, and also in Moscow. 
Powerless, and still running the country from behind the scenes. 
Dead, and alive. 
A real Schrödingerian treat. 
Either way, his absence continues to complicate Tehran’s efforts to govern and negotiate a ceasefire with the White House…or does it? 
Maybe the Islamic Republic doesn’t need a supreme leader. 
Not a *real* one, anyway. 
To better understand what Khamenei’s disappearance actually means for Iran's war and negotiations with the U.S., its internal balance of power, and society as a whole, Newsweek conducted in-depth interviews with three experts. 
In some cases, their responses were almost as varied as the aforementioned speculation on Khamenei’s whereabouts. 
Descriptions of Mojtaba ranged from “near-mythical leader” to “a boiled potato.” 
But each offered fascinating insight into what’s actually unfolding on the streets of Tehran and in the corridors of power—and whether Mojtaba will return at all. 
Tracking The Ayatollah 
The last few months have been a bit messy, what with all the bombing, Strait of Hormuz-shuttering, and on the edge of a global energy crisis-teetering. 
If you’re in need of a quick refresher of the key moments as they pertain to Khamenei, have a scroll through this timeline. 
From Leader to Legend? 
For most nations, the vanishing of a head of state with no telling when he’ll return would be intolerable. 
Imagine if Donald Trump (who this week yet again warned of a "massive attack" against Iran) disappeared for months and no one heard from him except for a few written statements. 
Before you get carried away with that fantasy, the point: For many Iranians, Mojtaba’s absence may not be a problem. 
If anything, given that 90 percent of the population is Shia Muslim, it might imbue him with an ethereal power. 
“Shia Islam holds that the Twelfth Imam—the messianic figure whose return is awaited at the end of time—has been absent from physical view for more than 1,200 years. 
This messianic figure need not be physically present among the faithful; guidance can be sought through spiritual, metaphysical, and doctrinal means,” said Peiman Salehi, an Iranian political analyst based in Tehran. 
Ali Khamenei’s assassination means he is remembered by Iranians in “mythic terms.” 
Mojtaba, communicating with the public via intermittent messages, could serve as a spiritual symbol around which Iranians could rally: Not a leader in day-to-day decision-making, but rather a nationalistic and ideological figurehead who communicates with the public almost via scripture. 
Khosro Isfahani, research director at the National Union for Democracy in Iran and open-source investigator at the Atlantic Council, agreed—with a very important caveat. 
He believes the military and intelligence chiefs dictating Tehran’s policy are actively trying to cultivate this notion of Khamenei as an absent Imam simply as a means of control to solidify their own power. 
“Mojtaba is an impotent young cleric who has the charisma of a boiled potato. 
He’s a horrible orator, and incapable of controlling the Islamic Republic and managing all the internal tensions in the way his father did. 
No one takes him seriously. 
“His absence is a blessing for the regime…it makes him a blank canvas. 
It allows the security forces of the regime and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) intelligence to paint whatever picture they like.” 
Isfahani, who spent more than a decade as an open-source researcher studying the Islamic Republic from inside Iran, pointed out that Mojtaba spoke and wrote so rarely before his father’s death that there is no linguistic corpus with which to verify that his statements came from his own pen. 
“The actual power holders in Iran, those who hold the guns, those who hold the loudspeakers of the media within the Islamic Republic, believe that the symbol of a supreme leader serves the regime long term. 14 centuries of an absent Imam have prepared the Iranian people for this moment and the regime will.” 
In a worst-case scenario, the “monolithic” Islamic regime could leverage this religious and spiritual symbolism to galvanize more radical elements to commit acts of terror, Isfahani said. 
Filling The Vacuum 
Perhaps Mojtaba will indeed endure as a mythical leader, if not a physical one. 
One thing we can say with certainty, however, is that Khamenei Jr. is not his father. 
Since the death of the Islamic Republic’s first supreme leader, Ruhollah Khomeini, in 1989, the various branches and factions of Iran’s political and security establishment have constantly jockeyed for position, power and favor. 
But the buck always stopped with one man, and one man only. 
Ali Khamenei spent some six decades shaping the very fabric of the Islamic Republic from within. 
He knew everything about everyone: what they valued, what they coveted, what they believed, and perhaps most importantly of all, what skeletons they had in their closets. 
This unparalleled level of knowledge and influence guaranteed his ultimate authority. 
Mojtaba has none of this. 
Even if he remains mentally and physically healthy behind the scenes, the death of Khamenei Sr. set in motion a power struggle in Tehran that Khamenei is effectively powerless to contain. 
“Iran is no longer governed from the top down—there’s a competition among the IRGC command, the Supreme National Security Council, parliament, the presidency, the diplomatic bureaucracy, and the clerical establishment,” said Andreas Kreig, Middle East expert and Associate Professor at King's College London's School of Security Studies. 
“The clearest winner is the IRGC. 
It controls the instruments through which any political authority is made real: military operations, intelligence, domestic repression...( 
IRGC Commander-in-Chief) Ahmad Vahidi and the wider security leadership occupy the space that a functioning supreme leader would normally control—increasingly managing the political system rather than defending it.” 
Iran’s parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, also appears to have benefited from Mojtaba’s absence. 
He has occupied the role of lead negotiator with the U.S. and serves as a bridge between the IRGC and Parliament—but Kreig cautioned he remains dependent on the Guards to deliver any settlement that may be reached. 
Aggressive Negotiations 
Iran has sustained significant damage at the hands of the U.S. military, yet continues to absorb American missiles and drone strikes as it leverages its control over the Strait of Hormuz and ability to punish Washington’s Gulf Arab partners in pursuit of a better deal. 
What began principally as a negotiation on ending its nuclear program in return for sanctions relief has dramatically shifted into a set of complex demands by Tehran, including a newfound authority over Hormuz, far away from the White House’s acceptable position. 
This is due in part to the Iranians’ deeper appreciation of the outsized influence that control over a critical waterway and their disruptive brand of asymmetric warfare carries. 
“The West, and President Trump in particular, appears to believe Iran's interest in controlling the strait is chiefly about extracting tolls and generating revenue. 
Inside Iran, this is at most a secondary consideration,” Palehi said. 
“The political and social push for Iranian control of Hormuz is motivated by what Iranians directly observed during the war: how quickly Western governments' tone shifted once the strait was closed. 
Control over the strait should be retained as an instrument…to pressure the West in return.” 
It is also, according to the experts, another consequence of Mojtaba’s absence. 
The indecisive, escalatory attitude of Tehran in negotiations with the Trump administration is a symptom of the ongoing internal power struggle. 
“Ghalibaf and (Foreign Minister) Araghchi want Washington and regional mediators to see them as indispensable interlocutors. 
The IRGC wants foreign governments to understand that no agreement can survive without its consent. 
Ultra-hardliners want to demonstrate that they can impose political costs on anyone who compromises. 
Negotiations have consequently become another arena for domestic power-building,” Kreig said. 
What Do The People Want? 
Following Ali Khamenei’s assassination, Trump saw the loss of a totemic leader as a potential catalyst for regime change and told Iranians to rise up. 
This revolution did not materialize. 
Had Mojtaba succeeded his father in peacetime as a stage-managed transition of power, the public may have had a hard time accepting such a dynastic accession by an unqualified, inexperienced cleric. 
But the circumstances by which Mojtaba was elevated had a uniting effect, according to Tehran-based Palehi. 
“Iranians have taken to the streets in support of the regime for nearly 150 consecutive nights—many of them the same women and tattooed young men who in 2022 stood against the Islamic Republic," Palehi said. 
“Iran is a society that unifies in the face of foreign aggression, whatever its internal grievances…When domestic hardship mounts, they may protest, criticize their government, even entertain the possibility of political change. 
But the moment a foreign power attacks Iran, that entire calculus shifts." 
In these conditions, the public should be willing to accept Khamenei’s absence, continue to support the supreme leader, and society will "function effectively," provided the periodic statements issued in his name continue. 
Isfahani agreed that Mojtaba’s extended absence will be tolerated, but not because of public support—simply because the new powerbrokers in the regime desire it. 
“In the West, we feel that every position in governance and statehood should have a purpose and should be occupied by popular, legitimate candidates. 
Senior officials within the Islamic Republic have said many times that popularity has nothing to do with how they govern," Isfahani said. 
“Maybe there was a small group of people who thought, after Khamenei Sr. died, perhaps we don’t need a supreme leader. 
But those in power believe it serves the regime long term as a symbol, so it is not going to change in the near future.” 
Kreig, however, is not so sure. 
“My judgment is that most Iranians view Mojtaba with suspicion, indifference or skepticism rather than loyalty,” Kreig said. 
“He inherited the supreme leadership through the first dynastic succession in the Islamic Republic’s history, yet he has never developed a public personality, political program or emotional connection with society. 
“Among the regime’s committed base, his injuries, the death of his father and the loss of family members can sustain a story of sacrifice and survival—there is some potential for a wounded-leader legend. 
But even legends require appearances, speeches and visible acts of leadership. 
“After several more months, the question will no longer be whether he is recovering. 
It will be whether Iran still needs an operational supreme leader at all.” 
Seriously Though…Will He Ever Come Back? 
“I do not believe Mojtaba has left Iran. 
He lost his wife, his sister, and father to this conflict. 
If leaving the country were something he considered a viable option, his father would have taken that option first, and spared his own family the fate of being killed alongside him,” Salehi said. 
“I see no compelling reason to credit Israeli and Saudi claims he’s been smuggled abroad. 
The core driver of his absence is not injury but security: uncertainty over whether the war could reignite, and a very real, well-documented threat of assassination, reinforced as recently as two weeks ago by Israeli media citing an Israeli official who placed him on a target list.” 
Kreig agrees Mojtaba is likely kept in a tightly controlled security environment, and gives little credence to rumors that he is dead. 
He did, however, accept reports that Khamenei sustained serious injuries that may have significantly reduced his capacity to move, communicate and govern. 
“He may be capable of approving selected decisions without being able to sustain the workload, movement or public exposure expected of a supreme leader. 
“It is plausible that he could have been transferred abroad for specialized treatment or protection, but the reporting remains unverified and comes from parties with an obvious interest in portraying Tehran as leaderless.” 
Regardless of the extent of Mojtaba’s capacities or injuries, he is almost certainly reliant on IRGC chiefs and members of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence for his continued security. 
All three experts acknowledged this cabal is likely exercising control over the flow of information to Khamenei, limiting the number of people who can communicate with him, and shaping any statements issued in his name to their benefit. 
This places him in a bind. 
More freedom and exposure heighten the risk of assassination, yet remaining under lock and key kills his ability to wield the influence he inherited. 
If Mojtaba is unable, due to injury or incompetence, to extricate himself from this dependency, he will have little to no genuine power to chart his nation’s path forward. 
His leadership will be hollow, even if a large majority of the people support it. 
That may well be exactly what the people now steering the Islamic Republic have in store for him. 
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7speakers39%attributed speech1,338writer words
Voice mapSelect a segment to jump to its words
Writer's voice • 8 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 3 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 17 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 31 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 24 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 20 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 6 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 10 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 3 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 4 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 21 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 9 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 5 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 33 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 16 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 11 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 26 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 3 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 26 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 23 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 4 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 19 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 31 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 20 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 20 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 28 words • 100.0% coveragePeiman Salehi • 31 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 12 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 40 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 24 words • 0.0% coverageKhosro Isfahani • 34 words • 0.0% coverageKhosro Isfahani • 14 words • 0.0% coverageKhosro Isfahani • 23 words • 0.0% coverageKhosro Isfahani • 5 words • 0.0% coverageKhosro Isfahani • 13 words • 0.0% coverageKhosro Isfahani • 21 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 49 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 54 words • 0.0% coverageKhosro Isfahani • 27 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 3 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 14 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 16 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 33 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 12 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 16 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 27 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 11 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 5 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 31 words • 0.0% coverageAndreas Kreig • 47 words • 0.0% coverageAndreas Kreig • 6 words • 0.0% coverageAndreas Kreig • 17 words • 0.0% coverageAndreas Kreig • 28 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 14 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 37 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 2 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 45 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 41 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 28 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 24 words • 0.0% coveragePalehi • 11 words • 0.0% coveragePalehi • 31 words • 0.0% coveragePalehi • 15 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 12 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 21 words • 0.0% coverageAndreas Kreig • 16 words • 0.0% coverageAndreas Kreig • 15 words • 0.0% coverageAndreas Kreig • 14 words • 0.0% coverageAndreas Kreig • 11 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 5 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 25 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 5 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 31 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 16 words • 0.0% coveragePalehi • 35 words • 0.0% coveragePalehi • 32 words • 0.0% coveragePalehi • 12 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 32 words • 100.0% coverageIsfahani • 24 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 24 words • 0.0% coverageIsfahani • 22 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 21 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 25 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 6 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 18 words • 0.0% coverageKreig • 30 words • 0.0% coverageKreig • 33 words • 0.0% coverageKreig • 11 words • 0.0% coverageKreig • 14 words • 0.0% coverageKreig • 13 words • 0.0% coverageKreig • 6 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 8 words • 0.0% coverageSalehi • 11 words • 0.0% coverageSalehi • 33 words • 0.0% coverageSalehi • 15 words • 0.0% coverageSalehi • 47 words • 0.0% coverageSalehi • 22 words • 0.0% coverageKreig • 22 words • 0.0% coverageKreig • 24 words • 0.0% coverageKreig • 33 words • 0.0% coverageKreig • 28 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 38 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 6 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 24 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 29 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 15 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 18 words • 0.0% coverage
Selected voice

Salehi

100%flagged-word coverage
128 attributed words15% of attributed speech79% writer coverage
0%2.5%5.0%Indoctrination-2.4 ptsWriter: 2.4%Salehi: 0.0%0.0%Unattributed Quote-2.1 ptsWriter: 2.1%Salehi: 0.0%0.0%Biased Writer Voice-0.3 ptsWriter: 0.3%Salehi: 0.0%0.0%

Attribution is sentence-level. Pattern percentages are calculated only from words assigned to that voice.

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Analysis

Hover over highlighted words in the article to view the associated bias or fallacy analysis.