Newsweek36%

Trump’s Saudi Nuclear Deal Fiasco May Finally Push Ally to China and Russia 36%

By Tom O'Connor46%

7/24/2026, 5:19:37 PM

BS Summary: This article contains 30 faulty reasoning types, including False Dilemma, Confirmation Bias, and Overconfidence Bias, with Negativity Bias as the most egregious example at 13.9% saturation with 260 hits. Analysis detected 2,614 faulty-reasoning hits from 1,873 analyzed words, generating a BS Score of 43% and a BS Rank of 36% (14,112 of 21,887 articles). This article is better (less manipulative) than 64.50% of the article peer group.

President Donald Trump's decision to impose a heavy post-deal condition on a landmark agreement that would see the United States support Saudi Arabia in establishing a civilian nuclear program has threatened to tank the deal and push the longtime U.S. partner to explore separate arrangements with China and Russia. 
Trump's declaration Thursday that the U.S.-Saudi agreement could only proceed if the Kingdom were to join the Abraham Accords, effectively normalizing ties with Israel, came less than 24 hours after both nations announced the deal. 
The new clause, later reinforced by White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, is widely viewed as a non-starter within Saudi Arabia, which has consistently held that diplomatic relations with Israel would be explicitly contingent on a roadmap for Palestinian statehood. 
"Any normalization must be preceded by recognition of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with the Saudi initiative approved by the Arab Summit in Beirut," Mohammed al-Sabban, a former senior adviser to the Saudi minister of energy, told Newsweek. 
With no evidence that either Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) or Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would budge on that fundamental front, the U.S.-Saudi deal appears dead on arrival unless Trump decides to back down. 
In the meantime, however, Riyadh has options and already has a history of collaboration with Beijing and Moscow on nuclear issues spanning uranium exploration, reactor technology, nuclear fuel and research. 
And with the prized contract of building Saudi Arabia's first commercial reactor now potentially up for grabs, the alternatives are all the more attractive. 
"Saudi Arabia has many alternatives, such as China, Russia and others, and numerous international companies are ready and willing to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in this area," Sabban said. 
"But we believe that any agreement with any country must be fully respected. 
"I think that if America continues to listen to Israel on every little thing, it will lose the countries that cooperate with it in various fields." 
Who Has Nuclear Programs in the Middle East? 
The nuclear history of the Middle East begins in the 1950s. 
Israel, Iran and Turkey were among the nations to begin establishing programs with support from the U.S. 
Atoms for Peace program, while Egypt and Iraq sought aid from the Soviet Union. 
Of those nations, Israel is the only one believed to have ever weaponized its program to produce a nuclear bomb. 
Israel, also the only country in the Middle East not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has pursued efforts to ensure its unique status by conducting operations against nuclear facilities in hostile nations in the region, including Iraq in 1981, Syria in 2007 and Iran from the 2000s to the present. 
Allegations that Iraq under longtime President Saddam Hussein was pursuing weapons of mass destruction—including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons—served as a pretext for the U.S.-led invasion that ousted him in 2003. 
Iran, a partner for Washington until the 1979 revolution established the Islamic Republic, is today the only country other than Israel in the region with domestic uranium enrichment capabilities. 
As with Iraq, claims that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons have been at the heart of U.S. and Israeli actions, including the 12-Day War last June and the ongoing conflict launched jointly by the allies in February. 
Across the Persian Gulf, the United Arab Emirates' Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant became the first of its kind in 2020, the product of a so-called 123 Agreement forged with the U.S. in 2009. 
Egypt and Turkey are currently constructing domestic nuclear power plants in line with deals signed with Russia's state-run Rosatom, which will also supply fuel, though Ankara, which already hosts U.S. nuclear weapons via a NATO agreement, has voiced a desire to enrich at home. 
Saudi Arabia has long campaigned for the U.S. to reach a similar arrangement as the UAE, but with some key caveats. 
Unlike the UAE, Saudi Arabia hoped to allow enrichment on its own territory and to avoid the kind of rigorous inspections regime that would come with the Additional Protocol, otherwise known as the "Gold Standard," present in the UAE deal. 
The U.S. and Israel appeared willing to concede this point in past talks under the condition that Saudi Arabia would join the Abraham Accords, the 2020 series of U.S.-backed deals that ultimately saw the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco establish relations with Israel. 
Talks collapsed in October 2023, however, with the onset of the war in Gaza, as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict once again rose to the forefront of global attention. 
In light of Washington's recent U-turn on what initially appeared to be a breakthrough on the deal and a setback for Netanyahu, former Saudi diplomat Saad Abdullah Al-Hamid told Newsweek that "the attempt to impose normalization without addressing the Palestinian question faces significant regional and popular obstacles. 
"This makes this condition a pivotal point that will either expedite a comprehensive solution or freeze the American nuclear program in favor of other options for Riyadh." 
Newsweek has reached out to representatives of the foreign ministries of China, Russia and Saudi Arabia for comment. 
Why China and Russia Could Step In 
China and Russia are not the only nations with the capacity to fill the U.S. role, but they're likely the most significant. 
European nations such as France and Germany also have had a role in nuclear cooperation in the Middle East, as has South Korea, which has emerged as an increasingly influential player in the nuclear and defense fields. 
Yet there are also strategic reasons for Riyadh's eyeing of Beijing and Moscow. 
As part of a possible three-phase trajectory recently outlined by Al-Hamid for the region's shifting view on security demands in light of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, should the first stage of "virtual deterrence" via obtaining civilian nuclear capabilities not prove sufficient in de-escalating threats, the next step would be a "diversification of strategic partnerships." 
This, according to Al-Hamid, would entail "building multi-polar defense alliances [with China, Russia and Asian countries] to acquire hypersonic missile technologies and highly advanced air defense systems as an interim alternative to nuclear deterrence." 
The third and "final option" entails one nation in the region actually weaponizing its nuclear program, producing a "domino effect." 
Then, he argued, "a 'multipolar nuclear Middle East' will emerge—the most dangerous scenario for instability in the Middle East." 
That's probably not a scenario China, Russia or the U.S. would like to see. 
But given the volatility of the current conflict surrounding the region, Beijing and Moscow have added motivation to forge inroads with Riyadh. 
Beyond potentially combating U.S. influence in the strategic region, China and Russia have an interest in balancing their ties, which are widely perceived as favoring Iran. 
Even if both countries maintain robust relations as is with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, U.S. intelligence has accused China of sending weapons to Iran and Russia of providing the Islamic Republic with intelligence and reconnaissance, adding lethal precision to its missile and drone strikes across the region. 
Both countries deny the claims. 
But new questions have been raised regarding China's regional relationships as its ships appear to have been spared a new campaign launched by Yemen's Iran-aligned Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthi movement, targeting vessels linked to Saudi Arabia's west coast Red Sea ports at a time when the Kingdom's east coast access remained disrupted because of the conflict in the Persian Gulf. 
John Alam, associate at the Urus Advisory risk consultancy, pointed to potential arrangements between Chinese companies and the Ansar Allah-led Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) that offers case-by-case permits to allow ships to bypass the blockade. 
"Various sites believe that these permits, which have to be requested on a per-ship basis, 24 hours in advance, indeed may have been issued to the Chinese tankers by the HOCC," Alam told Newsweek. 
"Alternatively, Ansar Allah may have organized some kind of backroom deal with China or may even be following an informal policy to not antagonize China." 
Addressing the Red Sea situation, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian told reporters Thursday that "all regional countries’ sovereignty and security must be respected." 
"Keeping international shipping lanes open and safe is a joint responsibility," Lin said. 
"We call on relevant parties to exercise restraint, resolve differences through continued dialogue and consultation, avoid moves that may aggravate tensions and help restore peace and stability to the Gulf region at an early date." 
What This Means for U.S.-Saudi Relations 
The architecture for either China or Russia to expand cooperation with Saudi Arabia is already theoretically in place. 
Over the course of at least a decade, Beijing and Riyadh have inked deals to launch initiatives such as the construction of a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor to power desalination plants and extracting uranium from seawater. 
In 2022, the state-run China National Nuclear Corporation established its Middle East headquarters in Riyadh. 
Russia and Saudi Arabia signed their first major nuclear cooperation agreement in 2015, outlining joint research and the exploration of further projects. 
Reportedly, Rosatom and the China National Nuclear Corporation have entered bids to construct the Kingdom's first reactor. 
But while Saudi Arabia has long engaged in a diversification of its foreign ties, some observers feel that Washington and Riyadh, whose strategic partnership has weathered many crises since its foundation during World War II, are most likely waiting for the other to blink amid the latest impasse. 
Al-Hamid, the former Saudi diplomat, argued that "the Trump administration is anticipating Chinese and Russian influence." 
He said that "Washington recognizes that Riyadh has other options for building reactors [such as Beijing or Moscow]; therefore, Washington is attempting to present its unique American offer while raising the political stakes to secure its future influence." 
Ultimately, he identified the U.S. move as a "negotiating tactic," if not a high-stakes one. 
Gary Samore, director of Brandeis University's Center for Middle East Studies who previously served as a senior National Security Council official tasked with nuclear policy, saw a potential bluff on Riyadh's end as well. 
"I agree that Trump's new condition has thrown a monkey wrench into the U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal because Saudi won't normalize with Israel until there is real progress toward establishing a Palestinian state, which obviously is not likely to happen soon, certainly not before the Israeli elections in October," Samore told Newsweek. 
"However, the Saudi threat to turn to Russia and China as an alternative to U.S. nuclear assistance is more of a negotiating ploy to pressure the U.S. to drop the new Abraham Accord condition than a realistic alternative." 
While Samore said "both China and Russia have the technical capacity to build nuclear power plants," noting the current extent of their work across the region, he pointed out that "neither has offered to export enrichment technology as the U.S. has." 
"I think MBS has a strong preference for nuclear cooperation with the U.S. [which is the Kingdom's main security partner], and he is willing to wait until either Trump drops the condition or a new Israeli government commits to achieving a Palestinian state," Samore said. 
"Likely to be a long wait!" 
Contact Newsweek editors on this story: Tom O'Connor and Dave Siminoff. 
Article reasoning-pattern comparisonThis article: 9.3%Tom O'Connor: 4.4%Newsweek: 3.0%Confirmation Bias9.3%This article: 5.2%Tom O'Connor: 0.6%Newsweek: 0.8%Anchoring Bias5.2%This article: 6.9%Tom O'Connor: 3.0%Newsweek: 2.7%Availability Heuristic6.9%This article: 2.3%Tom O'Connor: 1.1%Newsweek: 1.1%Representativeness Heuristic2.3%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 1.2%Newsweek: 0.6%Hindsight Bias0.0%This article: 9.0%Tom O'Connor: 4.3%Newsweek: 1.9%Overconfidence Bias9.0%This article: 1.1%Tom O'Connor: 5.4%Newsweek: 6.4%Framing Effect1.1%This article: 1.3%Tom O'Connor: 0.3%Newsweek: 0.3%Loss Aversion1.3%This article: 5.3%Tom O'Connor: 0.7%Newsweek: 0.6%Status Quo Bias5.3%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.1%Newsweek: 0.1%Sunk Cost Effect0.0%This article: 4.2%Tom O'Connor: 2.4%Newsweek: 1.8%Optimism Bias4.2%This article: 8.2%Tom O'Connor: 2.4%Newsweek: 1.6%Pessimism Bias8.2%This article: 13.9%Tom O'Connor: 6.3%Newsweek: 6.6%Negativity Bias13.9%This article: 2.0%Tom O'Connor: 1.9%Newsweek: 1.4%Self-Serving Bias2.0%This article: 5.1%Tom O'Connor: 1.7%Newsweek: 0.9%Fundamental Attribution Error5.1%This article: 2.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.3%Newsweek: 0.3%Actor-Observer Bias2.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 1.0%Newsweek: 1.2%In-Group Bias0.0%This article: 1.4%Tom O'Connor: 0.7%Newsweek: 0.4%Out-Group Homogeneity Bias1.4%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 1.7%Newsweek: 2.0%Halo Effect0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.0%Newsweek: 0.0%Horn Effect0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.0%Newsweek: 0.0%Dunning-Kruger Effect0.0%This article: 1.9%Tom O'Connor: 2.2%Newsweek: 1.5%Recency Bias1.9%This article: 0.6%Tom O'Connor: 0.2%Newsweek: 0.3%Primacy Effect0.6%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.0%Newsweek: 0.1%Blind-Spot Bias0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 1.0%Newsweek: 0.8%Ad Hominem0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.1%Newsweek: 0.3%Straw Man0.0%This article: 4.0%Tom O'Connor: 4.3%Newsweek: 4.2%Appeal to Authority4.0%This article: 13.2%Tom O'Connor: 2.9%Newsweek: 1.9%False Dilemma13.2%This article: 4.0%Tom O'Connor: 2.2%Newsweek: 1.0%Slippery Slope4.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.1%Newsweek: 0.1%Circular Reasoning0.0%This article: 7.5%Tom O'Connor: 3.3%Newsweek: 4.5%Hasty Generalization7.5%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.0%Newsweek: 0.2%Red Herring0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.8%Newsweek: 0.5%Bandwagon0.0%This article: 2.8%Tom O'Connor: 1.7%Newsweek: 4.0%Appeal to Emotion2.8%This article: 1.7%Tom O'Connor: 1.0%Newsweek: 0.9%Begging the Question1.7%This article: 5.3%Tom O'Connor: 4.5%Newsweek: 3.4%Post Hoc (False Cause)5.3%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.1%Newsweek: 0.2%Tu Quoque0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.1%Newsweek: 0.5%Burden of Proof0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.3%Newsweek: 0.2%Appeal to Nature0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.2%Newsweek: 0.3%Composition/Division0.0%This article: 1.8%Tom O'Connor: 1.6%Newsweek: 1.3%Anecdotal1.8%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.2%Newsweek: 0.1%No True Scotsman0.0%This article: 6.6%Tom O'Connor: 3.9%Newsweek: 1.7%Ambiguity (Equivocation)6.6%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.0%Newsweek: 0.0%Gambler’s Fallacy0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.3%Newsweek: 0.1%Middle Ground0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.1%Newsweek: 0.0%Personal Incredulity0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.1%Newsweek: 0.2%Special Pleading0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.1%Newsweek: 0.2%Genetic Fallacy0.0%This article: 4.3%Tom O'Connor: 1.8%Newsweek: 1.4%Unattributed Quote4.3%This article: 2.5%Tom O'Connor: 1.4%Newsweek: 1.0%Quote-first Misdirection2.5%This article: 3.8%Tom O'Connor: 2.1%Newsweek: 3.4%Biased Writer Voice3.8%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.6%Newsweek: 0.8%Indoctrination0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.3%Newsweek: 0.4%Politically Left Leaning Bias0.0%This article: 0.0%Tom O'Connor: 0.2%Newsweek: 0.4%Politically Right Leaning Bias0.0%This article: 2.3%Tom O'Connor: 0.3%Newsweek: 0.3%Attempt to Sell a Product or S…2.3%

1873 words analyzed.

Speakers

5speakers34%attributed speech1,242writer words
Voice mapSelect a segment to jump to its words
Writer's voice • 13 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 49 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 35 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 40 words • 0.0% coverageMohammed al-Sabban • 47 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 37 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 30 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 24 words • 0.0% coverageMohammed al-Sabban • 29 words • 0.0% coverageMohammed al-Sabban • 13 words • 0.0% coverageMohammed al-Sabban • 26 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 8 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 11 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 17 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 14 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 20 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 51 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 31 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 29 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 37 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 33 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 44 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 21 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 40 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 43 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 27 words • 0.0% coverageSaad Abdullah Al-Hamid • 47 words • 0.0% coverageSaad Abdullah Al-Hamid • 27 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 18 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 7 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 22 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 37 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 13 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 55 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 34 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 20 words • 0.0% coverageSaad Abdullah Al-Hamid • 19 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 14 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 22 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 26 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 52 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 5 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 63 words • 0.0% coverageJohn Alam • 36 words • 0.0% coverageJohn Alam • 34 words • 100.0% coverageJohn Alam • 25 words • 0.0% coverageLin Jian • 24 words • 0.0% coverageLin Jian • 13 words • 0.0% coverageLin Jian • 35 words • 0.0% coverageLin Jian • 6 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 18 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 35 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 15 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 22 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 17 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 48 words • 0.0% coverageSaad Abdullah Al-Hamid • 16 words • 0.0% coverageSaad Abdullah Al-Hamid • 38 words • 0.0% coverageSaad Abdullah Al-Hamid • 15 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 34 words • 0.0% coverageGary Samore • 51 words • 0.0% coverageGary Samore • 38 words • 0.0% coverageGary Samore • 41 words • 0.0% coverageGary Samore • 45 words • 0.0% coverageGary Samore • 6 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 11 words • 0.0% coverage
Selected voice

Gary Samore

100%flagged-word coverage
181 attributed words29% of attributed speech77% writer coverage
0%5.0%10.0%Biased Writer Voice-5.8 ptsWriter: 5.8%Gary Samore: 0.0%0.0%Attempt to Sell a Product -3.5 ptsWriter: 3.5%Gary Samore: 0.0%0.0%

Attribution is sentence-level. Pattern percentages are calculated only from words assigned to that voice.

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Analysis

Hover over highlighted words in the article to view the associated bias or fallacy analysis.