Jacobin60%

Why Mexico Welcomed Iran’s National Team With Open Arms 71%

By Antonio De Loera-Brust0%

7/3/2026, 11:43:55 AM

BS Summary: This article contains 34 faulty reasoning types, including Post Hoc (False Cause), Overconfidence Bias, and Hasty Generalization, with Biased Writer Voice as the most egregious example at 31.7% saturation with 608 hits. Analysis detected 4,927 faulty-reasoning hits from 1,919 analyzed words, generating a BS Score of 63.3% and a BS Rank of 71% (6,498 of 21,887 articles). This article is worse (more manipulative) than 70.30% of the article peer group.

The Mexican city of Tijuana, right across the border from California, had three teams this World Cup. 
First, and most obvious, is Mexico. 
Then there was Haiti, on account of the large Haitian migrant population that has put down roots in the city after being denied entry to the United States. 
And  last but not least  was the national team of Iran, which made its base camp in Tijuana after being denied entry to the United States other than for the actual games. 
Earlier this year, Iran’s participation in the 2026 World Cup seemed in doubt. 
With FIFA unwilling to move Iran’s games out of the United States and the Trump administration unwilling to let the team into the country for an extended stay, it seemed unlikely Iran would play its group stage games in Los Angeles and Seattle. 
Mexico offered the solution. 
The progressive government of President Claudia Sheinbaum offered to host the Iranian team in Tijuana, which would then travel to its games in the United States just for the day. 
Scenes of Mexican affinity for Iran followed. 
Mexicans turned out in large numbers to cheer the Iranian team in Tijuana and locals hosted watch parties for Iran’s games. 
Mexico’s enthusiasm for the Iranian team did not go unnoticed. 
Following Iran’s elimination from the tournament, the result of a controversial offside call disallowing a last minute victory against Egypt, the Iranian team itself acknowledged the extraordinary support it received from the Mexican public, writing “Your act will stay in our hearts.” 
Mexico’s decision to host the Iranian team in Tijuana is just the latest reflection of a decades-long affinity between Iran and Mexico, rooted in their mutual struggles for sovereignty in the face of US power. 
A Tale of Two Gulfs 
Even before the announcement of the Iranian team’s stay in Tijuana, popular sentiment in Mexico has been largely sympathetic to Iran in the war with the United States and Israel. 
After the illegal surprise attacks on Iran in late February, crowds gathered outside the Iranian embassy in Mexico City in solidarity; the US and Israeli embassies received only protests. 
President Sheinbaum no doubt spoke for most Mexicans when she criticized the US and Israeli attack on Iran, specifically citing the US bombing of a school that left 168 Iranian children dead, a massacre which the Iranian national team has also immortalized in the form of pins. 
Mexico’s own history of US invasion is no doubt a major factor influencing this organic solidarity. 
Of the eleven World Cup venues in the United States, four  Los Angeles, San Francisco, Dallas, and Houston  are within formerly Mexican territory lost to the US invasion in 1848. 
While most Mexicans need no introduction to this history, the Iranian embassy in Mexico City has also been eagerly fanning Mexican concerns about its powerful northern neighbor. 
The Iranian ambassador to Mexico warned “that if the US wins something in Iran, it will not be difficult for them to try to win in Cuba or even in Mexico.” 
These warnings ring true in Mexico City, where both the US oil blockade around Cuba and the prospect of US intervention in Mexico’s drug war have caused deep discomfort in Mexico City. 
The Iranian embassy has also drawn a comparison in the nomenclature debates over the “Persian” versus “Arabian” Gulf and the “Mexican” versus “American” Gulf. 
For Iran as for Mexico, the effort to rename a body of water long associated with their own name has wounded national pride. 
While Iranians have long insisted that the body of water to its southwest be called the “Persian”  and not “Arabian”  Gulf, the“Arabian Gulf,” is the preferred term of the US military, in part because it helps them please the Arab hosts of some of the US military’s most significant bases. 
In Mexico, President Donald Trump’s effort to rename the Gulf of Mexico has been received with similar offense. 
Though President Sheinbaum publicly laughed off President Trump’s renaming of the Gulf as “the Gulf of America”  jokingly proposing to instead rename the formerly Mexican territories in the US Southwest as “Mexican America”  the Mexican government also took formal legal action against Google for adopting the name on Google Maps. 
Yet for all of Sheinbaum’s public bravado, there is real fear that the Trump administration may take military action against Mexico yet again. 
The Trump administration has done everything it can to intimidate the country, including officially celebrating the Mexican-American War, invading Venezuela, and warning the government not to send oil to Cuba  a threat Mexico has so far heeded, humanitarian aid and public professions of solidarity notwithstanding. 
Stuck between a rock and a hard place, Sheinbaum has largely accommodated the US demands for a more militarized approach to Mexican criminal groups in hopes of avoiding direct US strikes on the country, something Trump has often threatened. 
In these circumstances, cheering on the Iranian national team as it competes on US soil counts as a small act of defiance from ordinary Mexicans in the face of the bully to its north. 
Mossadegh’s Mexican Example 
While the Trump administration’s belligerence has helped deepen the solidarity felt between peoples of the two nations, the ties between Mexico and Iran are older. 
Indeed, the example of the Mexican Revolution  which deserved to be understood as the first great twentieth- century revolt for sovereignty  did much to set the stage for Iran’s subsequent history, particularly on the question of sovereignty over natural resources. 
During the recent war, Iran’s ambassador in Mexico claimed that Iranian secular nationalist leader Mohammed Mossadegh’s effort to nationalize Iran’s oil industry in the early 1950s was inspired by Mexico’s successful nationalization of its oil industry in 1938. 
Indeed, the parallels are numerous. 
Both nationalizations were preceded by major strikes by local oil workers upset by unfair treatment by foreign oil companies. 
Both also ran into determined opposition from Britain. 
Yet ultimately, the divergent US reaction to Mexico’s nationalization of foreign oil companies in the 1930s to Iran’s nationalization of foreign oil companies in the 1950s would set the two nations on very different courses. 
Mexico’s own history of US invasion is no doubt a major factor influencing this organic solidarity. 
Like Mexico before its revolution, Iran was a vast but underdeveloped country with significant oil resources under foreign control. 
In 1950, Iran’s oil was entirely in British hands. 
It was with this concern in mind that Mossadegh had been democratically elected, with the aim of ensuring more of Iran’s vast oil wealth would be invested in its people. 
Yet just as it had been in Mexico fifteen years earlier, Britain was again fiercely opposed to seeing its oil companies nationalized. 
Here the United States could have gone its own way, as it had in Mexico in 1938, and as it would again in Egypt in 1956, recognizing General Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal over British objections. 
Yet rather than display the United States’ traditional independence from Britain’s rival imperial interests, the Eisenhower administration chose to join the British in overthrowing Mossadegh in a military coup. 
Iranian oil nationalization was not to be. 
Iran’s fragile democracy was destroyed. 
Instead, the shah would rule Iran as an absolute ruler until 1979, after which he traveled the world, spending large amounts of time in the picturesque Mexican city of Cuernavaca when the United States was unwilling to grant him entry. 
The US choice to run roughshod over Iran’s sovereignty in 1953 would poison relations between the two countries to this day, setting the world on the path to the recent and still not resolved conflict in the Persian Gulf. 
Good Neighbors? 
The US response to Mexico’s nationalization of its oil in 1938 was very different. 
This divergence is largely due to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s adopting the “Good Neighbor Policy,” which briefly committed the United States to the principle of nonintervention in Latin American affairs. 
At the time, Mexico was still in the throes of the Mexican Revolution, which had started in 1910 as a revolt against the decades-long rule of Porfirio Díaz, who welcomed foreign capital to Mexico, and spiraled into a nationwide social uprising followed by the adoption of one of the world’s first social democratic constitutions, codifying economic and political rights for Mexicans. 
By 1938, Mexico’s leader, Lázaro Cárdenas  who had personally fought in many of the revolution’s battles  took the dramatic step of seizing foreign-owned oil companies after a series of strikes by Mexican oil workers against British and American oil companies. 
Though US elites pushed hard for intervention, Roosevelt in large part accepted Cárdenas’s nationalization of US companies. 
The 1938 expropriation continues to play a large role in Mexico’s political culture  a blockbuster film was recently produced about Cárdenas’s oil expropriation and the history is treated almost religiously by the ruling MORENA party. 
Unlike the Roosevelt administration, Britain took a far harsher line toward Mexico’s oil nationalization, imposing sanctions and severing diplomatic relations with the country. 
Tellingly, Britain’s hard line with Mexico was motivated in large part by fear of “contagion” of similar oil nationalization efforts in Iran  foreshadowing the confrontation with Mossadegh fifteen years later. 
Crucially however, Roosevelt refused to join Britain’s coercive efforts to violate Mexican sovereignty over its natural resources as Eisenhower would do against Iran. 
Roosevelt’s conciliatory approach would ultimately turn Mexico into an ally during World War II. 
With US recognition of Mexico’s oil nationalization, Mexico would continue to be a major supplier of oil to the United States. 
After the sinking of Mexican oil tankers in the Gulf of Mexico by German U-Boats in 1942, Mexico joined the war on the side of the Allies, eventually sending oil, agricultural workers, and even a Mexican fighter plane squadron to support the US war effort in the Pacific. 
Sovereignty on the Pitch 
Today, of course, the Mexican sovereignty that was hard-won by the Mexican Revolution is under threat from the United States in ways unprecedented since the last US invasion of Mexico in 1917. 
The “Donroe Doctrine” has replaced the Good Neighbor Policy. 
The dilemmas facing the Sheinbaum government are more like those encountered by Mossadegh than Cárdenas  how to maintain national sovereignty in the face of such a hostile and powerful force? 
In this context, it is little surprise that Mexicans and Iranians have taken inspiration from each other. 
Just as Mossadegh was inspired by Cárdenas’s oil nationalization, so too are some commentators in Mexico beginning to see Iran’s ability to successfully fight the United States to a standstill as something worth emulating. 
With President Trump threatening Mexico’s sovereignty, Iran’s combative approach is attractive to Mexicans growing weary of President Sheinbaum’s repeated concessions on Cuba, migration, and the drug war. 
For now, cooler heads prevail in Mexico City, where the risks of a conflict with the United States are understood to be existential. 
But for a frustrated Mexican populace, cheering for Iran on and off the pitch offers one outlet for expressing Mexico’s own increasingly frustrated sovereignty. 
Even the very act of hosting Iran on Mexican soil served as a modest but meaningful reminder that Mexico continues to treasure and to exercise its independence from its northern neighbor in whatever way it can. 
As Mexican crowds gathered in Tijuana to bid goodbye to their city’s adopted team, the renewed connection between Mexico and Iran could last long after the 2026 World Cup is over. 
Article reasoning-pattern comparisonThis article: 9.7%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 6.1%Jacobin: 5.8%Confirmation Bias9.7%This article: 0.3%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.1%Jacobin: 0.4%Anchoring Bias0.3%This article: 2.2%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 1.5%Jacobin: 2.6%Availability Heuristic2.2%This article: 8.4%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 2.1%Jacobin: 1.3%Representativeness Heuristic8.4%This article: 8.4%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 3.5%Jacobin: 1.7%Hindsight Bias8.4%This article: 18.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 4.9%Jacobin: 2.2%Overconfidence Bias18.0%This article: 5.4%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 8.1%Jacobin: 6.8%Framing Effect5.4%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.3%Loss Aversion0.0%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.3%Status Quo Bias0.0%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.2%Sunk Cost Effect0.0%This article: 4.4%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 1.5%Jacobin: 1.5%Optimism Bias4.4%This article: 5.9%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 3.5%Jacobin: 1.8%Pessimism Bias5.9%This article: 14.3%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 5.3%Jacobin: 8.1%Negativity Bias14.3%This article: 1.3%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.3%Jacobin: 0.6%Self-Serving Bias1.3%This article: 3.3%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.8%Jacobin: 1.0%Fundamental Attribution Error3.3%This article: 1.4%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.4%Jacobin: 0.2%Actor-Observer Bias1.4%This article: 5.6%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 3.6%Jacobin: 2.0%In-Group Bias5.6%This article: 2.7%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.7%Jacobin: 1.0%Out-Group Homogeneity Bias2.7%This article: 4.8%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 3.3%Jacobin: 1.5%Halo Effect4.8%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.2%Horn Effect0.0%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.0%Dunning-Kruger Effect0.0%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.8%Recency Bias0.0%This article: 1.8%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.4%Jacobin: 0.4%Primacy Effect1.8%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.1%Blind-Spot Bias0.0%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.4%Jacobin: 1.7%Ad Hominem0.0%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 1.3%Straw Man0.0%This article: 5.7%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 1.4%Jacobin: 3.2%Appeal to Authority5.7%This article: 8.3%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 2.6%Jacobin: 2.7%False Dilemma8.3%This article: 2.8%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 1.5%Jacobin: 1.2%Slippery Slope2.8%This article: 0.2%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.1%Jacobin: 0.2%Circular Reasoning0.2%This article: 15.1%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 11.8%Jacobin: 8.0%Hasty Generalization15.1%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.2%Red Herring0.0%This article: 1.1%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.3%Jacobin: 0.4%Bandwagon1.1%This article: 7.8%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 4.6%Jacobin: 4.7%Appeal to Emotion7.8%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.5%Jacobin: 1.6%Begging the Question0.0%This article: 29.9%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 8.0%Jacobin: 3.6%Post Hoc (False Cause)29.9%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.2%Tu Quoque0.0%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.3%Burden of Proof0.0%This article: 2.7%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.7%Jacobin: 0.2%Appeal to Nature2.7%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.6%Composition/Division0.0%This article: 12.4%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 3.1%Jacobin: 2.5%Anecdotal12.4%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.2%No True Scotsman0.0%This article: 12.6%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 3.1%Jacobin: 1.6%Ambiguity (Equivocation)12.6%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.0%Gambler’s Fallacy0.0%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.1%Middle Ground0.0%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.1%Personal Incredulity0.0%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.2%Special Pleading0.0%This article: 2.7%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.7%Jacobin: 0.5%Genetic Fallacy2.7%This article: 5.8%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 1.4%Jacobin: 1.4%Unattributed Quote5.8%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.5%Jacobin: 1.0%Quote-first Misdirection0.0%This article: 31.7%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 18.7%Jacobin: 11.2%Biased Writer Voice31.7%This article: 10.2%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 2.6%Jacobin: 3.2%Indoctrination10.2%This article: 4.8%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 18.1%Jacobin: 7.0%Politically Left Leaning Bias4.8%This article: 5.1%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 1.3%Jacobin: 0.3%Politically Right Leaning Bias5.1%This article: 0.0%Antonio De Loera-Brust: 0.0%Jacobin: 0.3%Attempt to Sell a Product or S…0.0%

1919 words analyzed.

Speakers

3speakers17%attributed speech1,598writer words
Voice mapSelect a segment to jump to its words
Writer's voice • 9 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 17 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 6 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 28 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 34 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 13 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 43 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 4 words • 100.0% coverageClaudia Sheinbaum • 30 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 7 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 21 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 10 words • 0.0% coverageIran • 42 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 35 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 5 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 30 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 29 words • 100.0% coverageClaudia Sheinbaum • 47 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 16 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 32 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 27 words • 100.0% coverageIran • 31 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 32 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 24 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 23 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 52 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 18 words • 100.0% coverageClaudia Sheinbaum • 52 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 23 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 46 words • 100.0% coverageClaudia Sheinbaum • 39 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 34 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 3 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 25 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 42 words • 100.0% coverageIran • 38 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 5 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 19 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 8 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 35 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 16 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 19 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 9 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 30 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 22 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 39 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 29 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 7 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 5 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 40 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 39 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 2 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 14 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 30 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 61 words • 0.0% coverageLázaro Cárdenas • 42 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 17 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 36 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 23 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 31 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 23 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 14 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 21 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 48 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 4 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 32 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 9 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 31 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 17 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 34 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 27 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 23 words • 0.0% coverageWriter's voice • 24 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 36 words • 100.0% coverageWriter's voice • 31 words • 0.0% coverage
Selected voice

Lázaro Cárdenas

100%flagged-word coverage
42 attributed words13% of attributed speech91% writer coverage
0%50.0%100.0%Biased Writer Voice+64.6 ptsWriter: 35.4%Lázaro Cárdenas: 100.0%100.0%Indoctrination-12.3 ptsWriter: 12.3%Lázaro Cárdenas: 0.0%0.0%Politically Right Leaning -6.1 ptsWriter: 6.1%Lázaro Cárdenas: 0.0%0.0%Politically Left Leaning B-3.9 ptsWriter: 3.9%Lázaro Cárdenas: 0.0%0.0%

Attribution is sentence-level. Pattern percentages are calculated only from words assigned to that voice.

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Analysis

Hover over highlighted words in the article to view the associated bias or fallacy analysis.