Ahmadinejad Is Still Bad for Iranians  and Still Great for Israel 28%

By Hooman Majd0%

5/20/2026, 8:53:54 PM

BS Summary: This article contains 35 faulty reasoning types, including Negativity Bias, Hasty Generalization, and Confirmation Bias, with Biased Writer Voice as the most egregious example at 40.3% saturation with 451 hits. Analysis detected 3,790 faulty-reasoning hits from 1,120 analyzed words, generating a BS Score of 39.4% and a BS Rank of 28% (14,467 of 20,106 articles). This article is better (less manipulative) than 72.00% of the article peer group.

The bombshell New York Times report that the U.S. and Israel hoped to install former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the leader of Iran puts the lie to so much of what hawks in the West have been trying to sell their publics about the Iran war. 
Despite claims by President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Iran war was never about freedom for the Iranian people. 
That much is obvious thanks to Ahmadinejad’s role in recent Iranian history: In 2009, Iranians rose up against a stolen election in what was known as the Green Movement, which was violently crushed by Iran’s security forces to keep Ahmadinejad in power. 
Though a populist, Ahmadinejad at the time dismissed the protests as nothing more than the result of “emotions after a soccer match” or, in another instance, “dirt and dust.” 
These are not the bona fides of a leader who will lead Iran into democracy. 
Instead of a campaign for Iranian freedom, this war  like much of the U.S. and Israel’s last 20 years of going after Iran  has been about catastrophically weakening Iran. 
Here, reading between the lines of history, Ahmadinejad’s position as an Israeli–U.S.-backed coup leader starts to make sense. 
Ahmadinejad had been largely quiet until he suddenly reemerged into headlines on Tuesday with the Times report. 
After killing Iran’s supreme leader in the opening hour of the war, according to the Times, Israel targeted a building on Ahmadinejad’s street, ostensibly to “free” him from what was effectively either house arrest or the strict monitoring of his movements. 
According to some reports, the guards keeping watch on Ahmadinejad were indeed killed, but Ahmadinejad himself was injured, too. 
How, if the plot had been successful, was Ahmadinejad supposed to take over? 
Was the assumption that by assassinating the top leadership, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps generals, Ahmadinejad would be able to gain the support of the rest of the top echelon of the security forces? 
That would be a far-fetched notion. 
While he retained his populist credentials over the years, Ahmadinejad’s clashes with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and with the “nezam,” or regime, over social and political issues lost him whatever support he still had among the military wings and the Basij militia. 
Those forces  though they had helped crush the 2009 protests on Ahmadinejad’s behalf  remained fiercely loyal to Khamenei and the political system of “Guardianship of the Jurist.” 
For now, Ahmadinejad is nowhere to be found, raising suspicions that he is in the custody of the IRGC or dead. 
It’s hard to imagine the Iranian president who declared in his first few months in office that “Israel must vanish from the pages of time” and subsequently questioned the Holocaust being a good choice for Israel. 
History shows, though, how Ahmadinejad’s eclectic positioning has previously coincided with Israeli interests. 
Coming to power after President Mohammad Khatami’s reform movement and his call for “dialog among civilizations,” Ahmadinejad’s stances damaged Iran’s reputation almost beyond repair. 
And this was, somewhat ironically, a boon to Israel, whose leaders could point to the malevolent nature of the Islamic Republic. 
Ahmadinejad was the perfect figurehead for a bogeyman Iran that needed to be taken down a notch. 
Israel and its allies in Washington made hay of Ahmadinejad’s every word  for instance, his sponsorship of a Holocaust denial cartoon contest  and succeeded in turning his remarks into the justifications for an unprecedented and devastating sanctions program. 
Ahmadinejad’s rule was, in so many ways, bad for Iran. 
Which is why, even at the time and certainly later, there were suspicions privately aired in Tehran that he could actually be a Mossad asset  with the caveat, of course, that no hard proof ever emerged. 
Still, at a time when gaining the trust of the west in nuclear negotiations was paramount, Ahmadinejad was building Israeli hard-liners’ case against talks for them. 
Now, of course, the allegation that Ahmadinejad was primed as a coup leader  the first report from an even remotely reliable outlet of a real link to Israel  has only added to the rumors, as have his most recent trips abroad, to Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and to Guatemala, both allies and supporters of Israel. 
Trump himself admitted before this latest revelation that Israel bombed some of the people who were candidates to be an Iranian Delcy Rodríguez  the Venezuelan figure who seamlessly took control from kidnapped President Nicolás Maduro and reportedly is cooperating with the U.S. 
The most solid hint Trump gave was that he had someone “inside” Iran in mind, dashing the hopes of Iranian royalists. 
Whether or not it is true that Ahmadinejad was an Israeli asset  whenever he may have been recruited or even just unwittingly manipulated  he would have fit Trump’s bill. 
What he never would have been was a beacon of freedom for the Iranian people. 
Insofar as the broad contours of the Times report are accurate, we can now be assured that the well-being of the Iranian people has not really ever been at the top of either Trump or Netanyahu’s minds. 
The U.S. and Israel may have some commonality in what they’d like to see with Iran, but not entirely. 
Israel’s interests lie mostly in defanging Iran, even seeing it descend into a failed state that can neither threaten Israel nor challenge its hegemony in the region. 
The U.S., on the other hand, has consistently focused on Iran’s nuclear potential. 
Both Democratic and Republican administrations have indicated that if the nuclear issue was resolved to the satisfaction of the U.S., Iran could potentially be rehabilitated and rejoin the international community. 
That would have left Iran with the potential to grow into a regional powerhouse and global force  something Israel has long opposed, which is why it tried so hard to derail the 2015 nuclear agreement. 
Whatever happens, Ahmadinejad will never be a factor in Iranian politics, even if in the unlikely event that he one day resurfaces alive and free. 
The Venezuela option for Iran now seems silly, a chimera that should have never been considered. 
If the White House had listened to a handful of Iranians or those who know Iran well, rather than Netanyahu and war hawks in Congress, perhaps 175 school children and their teachers would be alive today. 
The Strait of Hormuz might be open and free. 
And a nuclear deal could have already been signed. 
Instead, there has been war and destruction, wasted lives and wasted treasure, chaos in the region, and the global economy wobbling. 
Ahmadinejad has once again been bad for Iranians  and now everyone else, too. 
Article reasoning-pattern comparisonThis article: 25.3%Hooman Majd: 15.8%The Intercept: 5.2%Confirmation Bias25.3%This article: 2.8%Hooman Majd: 0.5%The Intercept: 0.5%Anchoring Bias2.8%This article: 18.2%Hooman Majd: 3.4%The Intercept: 3.0%Availability Heuristic18.2%This article: 5.4%Hooman Majd: 1.1%The Intercept: 1.0%Representativeness Heuristic5.4%This article: 8.4%Hooman Majd: 3.0%The Intercept: 0.7%Hindsight Bias8.4%This article: 5.5%Hooman Majd: 6.4%The Intercept: 1.5%Overconfidence Bias5.5%This article: 4.9%Hooman Majd: 6.9%The Intercept: 9.4%Framing Effect4.9%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.8%The Intercept: 0.4%Loss Aversion0.0%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.2%The Intercept: 0.4%Status Quo Bias0.0%This article: 2.8%Hooman Majd: 0.3%The Intercept: 0.1%Sunk Cost Effect2.8%This article: 0.8%Hooman Majd: 3.7%The Intercept: 1.0%Optimism Bias0.8%This article: 9.2%Hooman Majd: 8.0%The Intercept: 2.3%Pessimism Bias9.2%This article: 34.3%Hooman Majd: 17.3%The Intercept: 12.5%Negativity Bias34.3%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.8%The Intercept: 1.0%Self-Serving Bias0.0%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 3.7%The Intercept: 1.4%Fundamental Attribution Error0.0%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.0%The Intercept: 0.2%Actor-Observer Bias0.0%This article: 2.6%Hooman Majd: 0.8%The Intercept: 1.8%In-Group Bias2.6%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 1.7%The Intercept: 1.1%Out-Group Homogeneity Bias0.0%This article: 1.9%Hooman Majd: 0.7%The Intercept: 1.0%Halo Effect1.9%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.3%The Intercept: 0.3%Horn Effect0.0%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.0%The Intercept: 0.0%Dunning-Kruger Effect0.0%This article: 7.8%Hooman Majd: 1.4%The Intercept: 1.3%Recency Bias7.8%This article: 3.8%Hooman Majd: 0.5%The Intercept: 0.3%Primacy Effect3.8%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.0%The Intercept: 0.0%Blind-Spot Bias0.0%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 5.8%The Intercept: 2.5%Ad Hominem0.0%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 1.2%The Intercept: 0.7%Straw Man0.0%This article: 15.6%Hooman Majd: 2.7%The Intercept: 3.5%Appeal to Authority15.6%This article: 9.2%Hooman Majd: 4.9%The Intercept: 2.0%False Dilemma9.2%This article: 3.2%Hooman Majd: 1.2%The Intercept: 1.7%Slippery Slope3.2%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.2%The Intercept: 0.1%Circular Reasoning0.0%This article: 28.9%Hooman Majd: 16.2%The Intercept: 7.2%Hasty Generalization28.9%This article: 3.8%Hooman Majd: 0.3%The Intercept: 0.3%Red Herring3.8%This article: 1.5%Hooman Majd: 1.1%The Intercept: 0.4%Bandwagon1.5%This article: 14.7%Hooman Majd: 6.9%The Intercept: 6.5%Appeal to Emotion14.7%This article: 2.0%Hooman Majd: 1.5%The Intercept: 1.4%Begging the Question2.0%This article: 20.4%Hooman Majd: 9.4%The Intercept: 3.2%Post Hoc (False Cause)20.4%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.3%The Intercept: 0.2%Tu Quoque0.0%This article: 8.6%Hooman Majd: 1.7%The Intercept: 0.8%Burden of Proof8.6%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.0%The Intercept: 0.1%Appeal to Nature0.0%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.3%The Intercept: 0.4%Composition/Division0.0%This article: 7.9%Hooman Majd: 1.3%The Intercept: 2.3%Anecdotal7.9%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.0%The Intercept: 0.1%No True Scotsman0.0%This article: 10.5%Hooman Majd: 3.7%The Intercept: 1.5%Ambiguity (Equivocation)10.5%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.0%The Intercept: 0.0%Gambler’s Fallacy0.0%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.3%The Intercept: 0.1%Middle Ground0.0%This article: 3.8%Hooman Majd: 0.8%The Intercept: 0.1%Personal Incredulity3.8%This article: 2.8%Hooman Majd: 0.4%The Intercept: 0.1%Special Pleading2.8%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 0.0%The Intercept: 0.4%Genetic Fallacy0.0%This article: 19.2%Hooman Majd: 3.2%The Intercept: 2.1%Unattributed Quote19.2%This article: 4.1%Hooman Majd: 1.6%The Intercept: 1.3%Quote-first Misdirection4.1%This article: 40.3%Hooman Majd: 25.1%The Intercept: 10.7%Biased Writer Voice40.3%This article: 1.5%Hooman Majd: 1.0%The Intercept: 2.1%Indoctrination1.5%This article: 0.0%Hooman Majd: 6.4%The Intercept: 6.3%Politically Left Leaning Bias0.0%This article: 2.4%Hooman Majd: 0.2%The Intercept: 0.3%Politically Right Leaning Bias2.4%This article: 4.4%Hooman Majd: 0.3%The Intercept: 0.5%Attempt to Sell a Product or S…4.4%

1120 words analyzed.

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